Jason Samuel as Judge Poser

Do you believe there's a double standard for religious beliefs?

W. K. Clifford is famous for his evidentialist thesis that "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything on insufficient evidence." On this way of thinking, someone who fails to apportion belief to evidence violates the ethics of belief. Although Clifford had religious beliefs in his sights, his thesis, by its very wording, applies to every sort of belief. Why then do people tend not to apply it to non-religious beliefs? Why do they hold religious beliefs to an exceedingly stringent standard, but refuse to do the same with political beliefs, say? Why the double standard?

Read on.

What's your default epistemology?

What epistomology is most reasonable to accept "on faith" when working upon non-epistemological issues when one has not developed a full epistemological theory of one's own?

Answer.

Viability Defense--no good.

                                            Blankley: Homosexuals and Feminists En Route to Rendering Roe v. Wade Irrelevant                                                 

Check out this interesting column by Tony Blankley, arguing that the definition of 'viability' used by Justice Blackmun in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), namely "potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid," is poised to be undermined by the very same artificial womb technology championed by homosexuals and feminists to avoid natural pregnancy. Id. at 160.

Two separate advances in this technology, on two different projects, are described by Blankley.

Recently, I had a discussion with some coworkers where we revisited a debate we had on abortion.  One interlocutor this time suggested the viability defense.  I see Blankley reminds us, as did my discussion, that this defense of abortion is still suggested despite what I believe should be obvious shortcomings.

The viability defense seems to ignore the fluidity of viability.  The viability of a fetus determines whether she is a person, entitled to all the rights and privileges of persons, namely the right to life.  So, until a fetus is viable, that is capable of surviving outside of a mother's womb, there is no morally significant reason to consider it a person, and thus protect her life, so the argument goes.  But really, I'm not sure that's how the argument goes.  I'm unsure whether the defense suggests the fetus be able to 'live' outside of a mother's womb or whether the fetus be capable of 'surviving' outside of a mother's womb.  The difference is in whether the child be capable or merely maintaining its own life without any assistance or whether it is capable of merely staying alive, but with assistance, outside of a mother's womb. 

In any case, while this additional uncertainty is worth exploring, my point here was to point out that viability is contingent upon the availability of technology.  So, viability may easily vary because of medical technology's availability or unavailability.  Since the viability of fetuses in less technologically adept locations will come later, it follows that those fetus's personhood will too.  Personhood then, rests on the availability of medical technology.  This seems like a horribly imprecise way to define the human person, let alone hinge a right to life.

(HT Fumare)

                            

Kierkegaard, The Arguments Against Christianity, and Psychologizing

Link: Maverick Philosopher Kierkegaard, The Arguments Against Christianity, and Psychologizing.

The Maverick Philosopher hits home again.  Not too long ago I had a debate with a young woman about abortion.  Shortly after I e-mailed Bill for advice on how a debate on abortion should be framed.  He was kind enough to reply. 

At the end of that same debate, my interlocutor suggested that however rational or nicely put my arguments were, my belief in God, especially my Catholicism accounted for my beliefs.  I didn't respond with the contempt I should have. 

Here, Bill covers that ground for me by giving me this example from Kierkegaard. 

"Judicial Mainstream" a Categorical Error?

One phrase that we're likely to encounter when we read or listen to commentary about the potential nominee to the Supreme Court is "judicial mainstream" (e.g. Sen. Schumer on Meet the press on 7.10.05). 

He said:

We hope there'll [sic] be a nominee that even though their views don't agree with ours are at least within the mainstream some--a judge who will meet the one test that really matters, they will interpret law, not make it.

The irony of his phraseology, i.e. "they will interpret law, not make it," I will cover sometime in the future.  His whole statement, in which he referred to a judicial mainstream, is typical of rhetoric we hear from those opposite the president on the ideological/political spectrum. Really, this rhetoric is slowing being adopted by fellow conservatives.  Perhaps conservatives have always used this phrasing to describe an ideal candidate for the Supreme Court.  To whomever we can trace its origin, really, is unimportant  What matters is what is meant by "judicial mainstream" or just "mainstream" in reference to the judiciary. 

Analagous Reasoning

In a recent post, the Maverick Philosopher touches on analagous reasoning.  Since the post touches on analagous reasoning, the sort meant often by legal reasoning, or more simply "thinking like a lawyer," I figure those interested in either law or philosophy, or both, may be interested.

I'll say this about analogies. An analogy is a comparison. To have a comparison, you have to have two things. (One cannot compare a thing to itself). Given that there are two things being compared, there must be one or more properties in respect of which the two things differ.

How to Become Analytic?

I recently wrote the Maverick Philsopher, William Vallicella, about two of his post [post 1, post 2].  I asked him-basically-how do I become analytic.  Read his response, but then bookmark is site for sure.

Link: Maverick Philosopher A Reader Asks: Are You Analytic? How Become Analytic?.

Who was the greatest philosopher?

Here are some portions of The Maverick Philsopher's post on the question, which was recently polled by the BBC:

I would give top honors to Plato.

Russell doesn't come close to greatness. As Feser remarks, his writings on ethics and religion are "drivel," which may be harsh but is in the vicinity of the truth. His work in logic, epistemology, and metaphysics, though brilliant and influential, is largely derivative from Frege and Hume. On the topic of existence, I believe he is just dead wrong. Surely, a philosopher who is wrong on fundamental questions cannot be called great.

Compared to earlier centuries, the 19th century was not particularly good, and the 20th was a disaster. A century in which Wittgenstein and Heidegger count as great is an impoverished one indeed. Wittgenstein, as J. N. Findlay once remarked, took every wrong turn a philosopher can take. Historically, he was an ignoramus, and his conception of philosophy miserable: the great problems of philosophy are for him nothing more than conceptual tangles that result from "the bewitchment of our understanding by language" (die Verhexung unseres Verstandes durch die Sprache).

Link: Here

Why Study Philosophy?

Link: Maverick Philosopher Why Study Philosophy?.

Zenit: On the Legacy of Philosopher Paul Ricoeur

Link: On the Legacy of Philosopher Paul Ricoeur [ 2005-06-16 ].